Crucially, this effort should identify specific legal concepts and standards that are either incommensurable with neuroscience, or for which the law indicates that neuroscientific evidence is unnecessary or unwanted. The law is not compelled to use neuroscientific evidence to render its decisions; judgments made on the basis of moral intuition, normative preference, or institutional precedent do not require the consult of neuroscientist. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence to make legal determinations about minds and brains should be constrained by the limits of scientific inference. Good law cannot follow from bad, or badly used, science.
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The behavioral-economics alternative adds limits to computational ability, willpower and selfishness to the historical optimization approach. Knowledge of these limits comes from psychology and, more recently, neuroscience. In this general behavioral view, prices, income and information certainly affect behavior. However, the way in which information is processed to make choices can be described by psychological principles that often are not statistically optimal. Other psychological factors, such as how choices are described (or, equivalently, framed) and attended to, can affect economic behavior as well.
Behavioral economics is especially useful when decisions are complex and optimality is difficult to achieve. These decisions include some of the most important choices people make, Primers such as education, career, buying cars and houses, and even mate choice and child-bearing.
Complexities in economic choices
Here, I consider four types of complexity: risk, time, strategizing, and prosociality. In each case, specialized behavioral theories have emerged that explain a variety of lab and field data and are beginning to be understood at the neural level.
Risk
Most natural choices yield a probability distribution over possible rewards or outcomes, such as ripeness of foraged fruit or how long a new Apple computer will last. These probabilities quantify the notion of risk. A risk is a statistical likelihood of a particular outcome, whether good or bad. How are such risks valued? One theory is that risky choices are described by various statistical moments, particularly the mean (or expected value) and variance. Human studies have shown reliable encodings of expected value in striatum and of variance in insular cortex. Insula activity suggests that risk is 'felt' emotionally, which may explain why people are overly fearful of rare, vivid events (e.g. airplane crashes).
A different approach, called 'prospect theory', comes from psychology. In prospect theory, rewards are valued relative to a point of reference, r, and the subjective value of losses is  times larger than the value of equal-sized gains (a property called 'loss-aversion'; u(-x) = -u(x) for x > 0). In addition, a probability p is weighted nonlinearly through a function (p), which may weight rare events too heavily or, in the other extreme, so lightly that they are altogether ignored.
Prospect theory incorporates these probability weights in a psychologically plausible reconceptualization of 'expected utility',
, where x i are all possible outcomes. (In its standard formulation, expected utility hypothesizes that gambles are valued according to the probability-weighted average of utilities,  i p(x i )u(x i )). The logic underlying expected utility is that when two risks share a common outcome X with common probability p(X), that common (X,p(X)) element can be cancelled out when comparing the two risks.
This cancellation principle is logically appealing. However, it is biologically implausible, because it supposes that people naturally dissect and focus only on differences in mentally represented risks in making choices. The cancellation principle is reliably violated by the choices that subjects make, both in decades of lab experiments with humans and many other species, and in field data from financial and gambling markets.
The sensitivity to a reference point for value proposed by prospect theory corresponds to the natural tendency of human biological systems to adapt to current states. Learning is also facilitated by computing the difference between reward and a reference state (or prediction), called 'reward prediction errors'. Dependence on reference points has been shown in many experiments as well as in field studies about sales of stocks and houses, and decisions by taxi drivers about how long to work. A clear example is that gamblers have a very strong preference to quit when they break even, or at a small loss (Figure 1) . Gamblers who are winning typically keep gambling (and lose on average), so the resulting distribution of net winnings has a few gamblers winning money, a huge spike near zero, and a long, sad left tail of big losers who kept trying to break even and could not.
Time
Most human choices create costs and benefits that are distributed across time. Humans are consistently challenged by choices that are unpleasant now and (at least abstractly) valuable later -such as exercise -or delicious now and deadly later -such as cheeseburgers and cocaine. Simple computational models of these intertemporal tradeoffs assume that costs and rewards at future times, t, are discounted by a weight w(t) < 1.
There are many theories about the shape of the w(t) function and its neural implementation. Economic theories favor an exponential Figure 1 . The break-even effect. Net winnings of casino gamblers during a single begin-and-end gambling session over a onemonth period (n = 2392). The large spike around zero (and small losses) indicates a break-even effect. Gamblers who start to win appear to keep gambling until they get close to zero (hence the absence of large net wins). Gamblers who fall far behind (by more than $400) seem to keep gambling until they break even or lose a much larger amount (shown by the left tail). Data reprinted with permission from Jamie Lien and Jie Zheng. function, w(t) =  t , which enforces the logical principle that future plans will actually be carried out when the future arrives. However, the hyperbolic function w(t) = 1/(1+kt) typically fits data better. Early debate in neuroeconomics produced evidence in favor of both the exponential and hyperbolic theories.
Theories assuming stable weighting of rewards over time are challenged by evidence that current and future rewards are treated very differently when small, seemingly inconsequential changes in their presentation and description are made. For example, describing a week as seven days makes the delay seem longer and increases impatience.
The distinction between 'modelfree learned valuation' and 'modelbased mentally constructed valuation' helps make sense of these data on differences in choices over time. In an exemplar study, subjects chose between 'smaller, sooner' (SS) or 'larger, later' (LL) rewards. In the control condition, LL rewards were offered on a schedule given in terms of time only. In the 'episodic' condition, the LL rewards were scheduled to occur on datescalled episode tags -of personal significance (both positive and negative) to the subjects. When making subjective choices between SS and LL rewards, subjects put higher weight on later rewards when they occurred on episode-tagged days. Activity in the memory-storage hippocampal region was associated with the tag effect.
Strategizing
Many important economic interactions are social -that is, what one person does has an effect on another person, by either helping (cooperatively) or hurting (competitively) him or her. Game theory is a theory of such social interactions, in which agents choose strategies, given available information, and the collective strategies chosen by all agents create a general outcome, which each agent assigns a numerical value.
The most common analysis in game theory assumes that all agents correctly guess what others will do and consequently choose their optimal strategy in light of that guess. These assumptions imply a learned balance or equilibrium in choices and guesses.
Despite its theoretical elegance, equilibrium analysis is often a poor empirical description of what happens before agents can learn or figure things out. Behavioral economics offers a different theory, called a 'cognitive hierarchy' or 'level-k' theory. In cognitive hierarchy, there is a hierarchy of player reasoning. The lowest-level players (level 0) choose a heuristic, focal strategy (not thinking about what others are likely to do). Players doing k levels of reasoning are partially strategic, because they correctly anticipate what players at levels 0 to k -1 do but neglect actions of players at level k and above. This theory gives a promising account of data from lab and field strategic choices, and it provides an explanation for experimental observations of visual fixations to possible payoffs and congruent fMRI data.
These ideas are illustrated by data from a Swedish lottery, in which people pick five-digit whole numbers (1 to 99,999), with the lowest unique number winning a large prize (Figure 2) . People want to pick low numbers but also want to choose numbers that nobody else will think to pick. Mathematically, the theoretical equilibrium is a statistical mixture in which numbers from 1 to 5513 are chosen most often, with declining frequency, and higher numbers are very rarely chosen. In reality, very low numbers are chosen far more often than predicted. Presumably this happens because naïve lottery players do not realize that others are likely to choose those numbers too, which will render them non-unique. The cognitive hierarchy theory fits the data much better than the equilibrium approach, with an estimated average thinking level of 1.80, a number close to many lab estimates.
Prosociality
Most economic analyses assume that people are narrowly self-interested. Behavioral economics has explored several other motives and types of prosociality.
The simplest prosocial motive is to reduce inequality in what different people get. A more complex motive is reciprocity, which corresponds to rewarding or punishing others based on their actions toward you. A motive that is even more delicate is social image -i.e., wanting to be perceived by other people as generous. Experiments have shown evidence for all of these motives. For example, in strategic games in which people can contribute their own money to help others, people are usually somewhat generous (tending to decrease inequality), contribute more if they think others will (due to positive reciprocity), and give more when their contributions are identified publicly. These human social motives are also modulated by group membership, in ways that are undoubtedly linked in some way to group affiliation in nonhuman apes and primates.
Neuroeconomic foundations
A new synthesis of psychology, economics, and neurosciencecalled 'neuroeconomics' (or decision neuroscience) -investigates which economic theories are consistent with biological computation.
Many neuroscientific studies show that choices are guided by multiple controllers. General controllers are: innate value of primary rewards and punishments, which do not require learning (such as food or pain); 'model-free' action-reward values Q(a) learned by trial-anderror; and model-based goal values, denoted Q(s,a), which require mental representation of how actions a in different states s lead to rewards.
In contrast, the standard economic model of choice hypothesizes that the optimal action, a*, is flexibly chosen to maximize Q(s,a*), where the state, s, includes current information, prices, and income, and the value of a* reflects a stable 'preference'.
Knowledge of neural controllers suggests that actual choices could depart from flexible maximization in three different ways: first, during model-free learning of Q(a), the learned value of an action will change over time (i.e., preferences are learned and hence are not always stable).
Second, after a steady-state action value is learned, if it is repeated frequently enough, it can become overlearned or 'habitual'. By definition, a habitual action does not respond to information, prices, or income, as assumed in economic theory. Overlearned, insensitive habits of this type could describe short-run behavior during addiction, mindless eating, brand loyalty, social conformity, and other private choices that add up to important social trends.
Third, model-based valuation of Q(s,a) requires conceptual representations, which are influenced by principles of memory, association, social norms and imitation as well as other influences. Precisely because this kind of valuation must be flexible, it can lead to action choices that are likely to be overly responsive to small changes in how choices and states are described. Furthermore, in market economies, profit-maximizing firms can be motivated to create descriptions that exploit properties of conceptual representation, so that people overpay for goods with high perceived Q(s,a).
What about markets?
Economic analysis is generally concerned with aggregate behavior in markets, political systems, and entire economies (macroeconomics). A good model of individual choice is the foundation for studying collective behavior. Therefore, behavioral economics must always address the central question of how biological tendencies of individual agents are either limited or amplified by market and political forces.
The longstanding premise in economics is that even if many agents make mistakes, market structures lead to prices and allocations that are approximately optimal. For example, suppose most people are not sure how long they will live and tend to wishfully overestimate their longevity. Life insurance is priced by highly skilled actuaries (who can forecast longevity for classes of people). If there is little competition, companies will offer insurance with a big payoff if people live an unusually long time. Optimistic people will buy it, and insurance companies will earn extra profits. However, if consumers shop around and companies compete, prices can be driven to the actuarially correct level.
As this example illustrates, markets create incentives for firms to take advantage of customers' mental limits. Whether these limits are exploited depends on how much firms compete and how well customers -and both government and private institutions (such as Consumer Reports or Yelp) -'police' the market.
Behavioral economics has contributed some ideas about how firms and governments can improve consumer choice. The best example so far was inspired by the discovery that people disproportionately prefer the 'default' choice, i.e., the choice that is imposed unless they 'opt out' of it and into a different choice. Several companies changed their policies so that workers were defaulted into a 401(k) retirement plan (unless they opted out), which put a fraction of their next pay raise into tax-deferred savings. This clever system guarantees that take-home pay does not go down when savings levels are increased -because the extra savings come out of a pay raise -and commits to savings increases that will take place in the future, a delayed self-control that people find easier to accept.
Future trends in behavioral economics
Behavioral economics is moving in several directions. One direction, mentioned just above, is to prescribe ways to construct choices to help people of average mental skill avoid making bad decisions, while preserving freedom of choice for people who are confident that they don't make mistakes. A related direction is looking for evidence of how well behavioral principles can be used to explain prices and allocations in everyday markets, such as asset and labor markets.
Exploring the neural basis of economics is progressing rapidly, helped along by the fact that mathematical expressions of neural computation can be compared to the math used to describe economicutility maximization. An untapped potential contribution of economics to neuroscience is the idea that everyday choices that people face are specifically designed, by market and political forces, to bias choice toward what the designer wants to happen. Little is known about how the brain works when facing such 'adversarial' choices.
Linking directly with biology, there is a large undergoing effort to combine data from many studies with socioeconomic outcomes and genome-wide association data to greatly improve the statistical power needed to identify genuine associations. Economists also use the language of evolutionary selection to describe and explain aspects of human behavior and institutions, but they have not done so with both formal discipline and careful observation. More direct communication with biologists would be useful in such a synthesis.
